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Abstract 
This paper presents the extensive literature survey based both on theoretical 
rationales for hedging as well as the empirical evidence that support the 
implications of the theory regarding the arguments for the corporate risk 
management relevance and its influence on the company’s value. The survey of 
literature presented in this paper has revealed that there are two chief classes of 
rationales for corporate decision to hedge - maximisation of shareholder value 
or maximisation of managers’ private utility. The paper concludes that, the total 
benefit of hedging is the combination of all these motives and, if the costs of 
using corporate risk management instruments are less than the benefits provided 
via the avenues mentioned in this paper, or any other benefit perceived by the 
market, then risk management is a shareholder-value enhancing activity. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial or corporate risks - the risks to a corporation stemming from price 
fluctuations - are pervasive, and directly or indirectly influence the value of a 
company. A combination of greater deregulation, international competition, 
interest rates and foreign exchange rate volatility, together with commodity price 
discontinuities starting in the late 1960s, heightened corporate concerns, which 
have resulted in the increased importance of financial risk management in the 
decades that followed (Allen and Santomero, 1998).  It should be noted that, 
before derivatives markets were truly developed, the means for dealing with 
corporate risks were few, and thus financial risks were largely outside managerial 
control. Firms resorted to operational alternatives like establishing plants abroad to 
minimise exchange-rate risks, or to natural hedging by trying to match the currency 
structure of their assets and liabilities (Santomero, 1995). During the 1980s and 
1990s, markets for derivative instruments have developed and grown at a 
breathtaking pace, and many corporations have become active participants in 
derivatives markets. Since then, the range and quality of both exchange-traded and 
OTC derivatives, together with the depth of the market for such instruments, have 
expanded intensively (Allen and Santomero, 1998). With the development of the 
derivatives market, active risk management has become an important part of 
modern corporate strategy, as can be seen from the fact that financial executives 
in companies all around the world have ranked risk management as one of their 
most important objectives (Bartram, 2000).  
However, for a long time it was believed that corporate risk management is 
irrelevant to the value of the firm and the arguments in favour of the irrelevance 
were based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; 
Mossin, 1966) and the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
One of the most important implications of CAPM is that diversified 
shareholders should care only about the systematic component of total risk. On 
the surface it would appear that this implies that managers of firms who are 
acting in the best interests of shareholders should be indifferent about hedging of 
risks that are unsystematic. Miller and Modigliani's proposition supports CAPM 
findings. The conditions underlying MM propositions also imply that decisions to 
hedge corporate exposures to interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices are 
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completely irrelevant because stockholders already protect themselves against such 
risks by holding well-diversified portfolios.  
However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging 
activities that are directed at the reduction of unsystematic risk. In the real world, 
financial managers and treasurers give a great deal of thought to matters of 
capital structure and securities design. Additionally, the corporate use of 
derivatives in hedging interest rate, currency, and commodity price risks is 
widespread and growing. As an explanation for this clash between theory and 
practice, imperfections in the capital market are used to argue for the relevance of 
corporate risk management function. Scholars have constructed two classes of 
explanations or determinants for management concern with hedging of non-
systematic risk. The first class of explanations focuses on risk management as a 
mean to maximise shareholder value, and the second focuses on risk 
management as a mean to maximise managers’ private utility. This paper 
presents and discusses the theories related to these arguments and their empirical 
implications. 
2. Shareholder Maximisation Hypothesis  
2.1 Cost of Financial Distress  
One of the possible explanations for managers’ choices of risk management 
activities on behalf of their firms is based on the fact that non-systematic risk 
does affect the probability that a firm will go bankrupt or experience financial 
distress. If financial distress generates real costs for the firm as a whole, then 
shareholders will be interested in hedging this risk (Campbell and Kracaw, 
1987). Additionally, the cost of financial distress is one of the reasons why firm 
performance and market value might be directly associated with volatility 
(Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and 
Titman, 1998; Haushalter 2000). In the MM world, financial distress is assumed 
to be costless. Hence, altering the probability of financial distress does not affect 
firm value. If financial distress is costly, firms have incentives to reduce its 
probability, and hedging is one method by which a firm can reduce the volatility 
of its earnings. Costs of financial distress include the legal and administrative 
costs of bankruptcy, as well as the agency, moral hazard, monitoring and 
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contracting costs which can erode firm value even if formal default is avoided 
(Myers, 1984). By reducing the variance of a firm’s cash flows or accounting 
profits, hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of 
financial distress.  
The literature is filled with such stories. The classic paper by Warner 
(1977) was the first to present empirical evidence of the bankruptcy cost, but 
some other studies, such as Weiss (1990), have continued to reinforce its 
importance. Smith and Stulz (1985) used the same argument to justify a desire 
for reduced volatility. The authors were on the firm ground, as there is ample 
evidence that financial distress leads to substantially increased costs associated 
with bankruptcy proceedings, legal costs, and perhaps most importantly, the 
diversion of management attention from creating real economic value.  
Graph 1. Hedging and the cost of financial distress 
 
Source: Bartram, 2000 
While the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm value, it augments 
shareholder value even further by simultaneously raising the firm’s potential to 
carry debt. It is known that corporate debt creates a fixed cost that can be used as 
a competitive weapon (e.g. see Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988). 
This follows from the fact that interest payments of debt are made out of pre-tax 
income creating a tax shield of debt financing. As shown in graph 2, corporate 
risk management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a higher 
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optimal debt ratio (or lower financing costs), and the tax shields of the additional 
debt capital further increases the value of the firm. However, shareholders must 
account for hedging costs when they decide among alternative hedging strategies 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Graph 2. Hedging and the cost of financial distress 
 
Source: Bartram, 2000 
Dobson and Soenen (1993) have argued that foreign exchange hedging will 
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priority than equity. He has shown that hedging increases value by improving 
contracting terms. The hedging instrument specifically evaluated in his study is a 
forward contract, but the analysis also applies to other financial contracts, such 
as options and swaps, which alter the cash flow distribution such that there is a 
reduced likelihood of small cash flow realisations. Hedges provide net cash 
inflows in those states where the firm’s cash flows are low, bonding its ability to 
meet commitments in additional states. Bessembinder's (1991) has proven that 
hedging can secure value-increasing changes in contracting terms with creditors, 
customers, employees, and suppliers if the contracts with these parties have 
initially positive Net Present Value (NPV).  
When exploring corporate hedging behaviour, scholars are particularly 
interested in the relationship between hedging and leverage, since theoretical 
considerations suggest that both affect expected costs of financial distress and 
agency costs. Greater leverage exacerbates those costs, but greater hedging 
ameliorates them, suggesting a positive linkage. Dolde (1995) has controlled for 
financial risks differences by conducting a survey of Fortune 500 firms in 1992 
and presents statistically significant evidence that leverage and hedging are 
positively related. He also constructed a direct measure of expected costs of 
financial distress and found some evidence that hedging measures interact with 
and mitigate the effects of leverage. 
Haushalter (2000) has found that the use of commodity derivatives is to 
be related to the reduction of expected bankruptcy costs, which should increase 
firm value. He examined the hedging activities of oil and gas producers and has 
documented a wide variation in hedging policies among analysed companies. 
The tests conducted have found that this variation is associated with several 
differences in the firms’ characteristics. Among oil and gas producers that hedge, 
the extent of hedging is related to proxies for financing costs. Conditional on a 
company hedging, the fraction of production hedged is increasing in the debt 
ratio, is greater for companies that pay out a smaller fraction of income in 
dividends, and is less for those that do have a debt rating. This finding is 
consistent with theories of the transaction cost of financial distress.  
Mian (1996) has investigated all three types (commodity, interest rate, or 
currency) of hedging activities for a sample of 3,022 firms. He has found no 
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significant difference in leverage between hedgers and nonhedgers. Examination 
of type of a risk hedged yields results that are different to the two-way 
classification (hedgers vs. nonhedgers). The evidence indicates that interest-rate 
hedgers have higher leverage and longer term debt as compared to nonhedgers of 
interest-rate risk. In contrast, currency-price hedgers have lower leverage and 
shorter term debt as compared to nonhedgers of currency-price risk. Leverage is 
positively correlated with interest-rate hedging and negatively correlated with 
currency-price hedging. Mian’s (1996) evidence has shown that lumping 
interest-rate hedging and currency-price hedging into one broad category 
essentially “averages out” the negative correlation between leverage and 
currency-price hedging, and the positive correlation between leverage and 
interest-rate hedging.  
It could be concluded that the link between hedging and financial 
leverage supports the notion that hedging can reduce financing costs and it is 
also consistent with the predictions of Stulz (1996) who has argued that 
corporate hedging can be viewed as a technique that allows managers to 
substitute debt for equity. If financial distress is costly and if there is an 
advantage to having debt in the capital structure, hedging may be used as a 
means to increase debt capacity. As a result, a company's risk management 
policy should be made jointly with its financing policy. If hedging and 
financing policies are made jointly, evidence on literature survey presented in 
this paper indicates that studies of corporate financing decisions need to 
consider corporate hedging policies as well. In particular, a company facing 
relatively high costs of financing that hedges, may choose the same capital 
structure as a firm with lower costs of financing that does not hedge. Without 
controlling for hedging, the relation between capital structure and the 
determinants of the costs of financing will be missed.
2.2 The Agency Cost of Debt 
  
Besides being in a position to know more about the firm's prospects than 
investors, management also sometimes has the power to take actions that transfer 
value from bondholders to shareholders. The first agency conflict considered is 
usually referred to as the underinvestment problem. Jensen and Smith (1985) 
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have argued that when a substantial portion of the value of the firm is composed 
of future investment opportunities, a firm with outstanding risky bonds can have 
incentives to reject positive net present value projects if the benefit from 
accepting the project accrues to the bondholders. In this example, the manager of 
a levered firm has an incentive to limit the scale of investment because the 
additional returns from further investment accrue primarily to bondholders.  
The second agency conflict considered is usually referred to as the asset 
substitution problem, also known as the risk shifting problem, which 
encountered by the corporation in selecting among mutually exclusive 
investment projects. Jensen and Smith (1985) have observed that the value of the 
stockholders’ equity rises and the value of the bondholders’ claim is reduced 
when the firm substitutes high risk for low risk projects. Once a corporation has 
obtained debt financing, it is well known that by switching from a relatively safe 
investment project to a riskier one, the corporation can increase the value of its 
equity at the expense of its bondholders. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the fact that the residual claims of shareholders can be interpreted as a call option 
on the assets of the firm (e.g., see Black and Scholes, 1973). The value of the 
option will increase as the underlying assets' volatility increases. Thus 
management – acting in the interests of shareholders – will tend to prefer capital 
projects with volatile cash flow streams.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith and Warner (1979) 
have indicated that actions available to the firm after bonds are sold can reduce 
the value of the bonds. Unless protected against these forms of managerial 
opportunism, creditors can be expected to reduce the price they are willing to pay 
for the bonds. This reduction in price (or increase in required yield), necessary to 
compensate creditors for managerial opportunism and combined with the costs of 
writing and enforcing covenants, are collectively described by economists as the 
“agency costs of debt”. Some of these actions are prevented by provisions in 
debt covenants (Mayers and Smith, 1982; 1987). But it should be noted that debt 
covenants could be welfare reducing as they limit the degrees of freedom of 
management and possibly obstruct the realisation of profitable, yet risky 
investment alternatives.  
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According to Dobson and Soenen (1993), there are three sound reasons 
based on agency costs why management should hedge corporate risk. First, 
hedging reduces uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow stream thereby lowering 
the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency cost is borne by management, assuming 
informational asymmetry between management and bondholders, hedging will 
increase the value of the firm. Therefore, management will rationally choose to 
hedge. Second, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing 
through exchange risk hedging will tend to reduce the risk-shifting agency 
problem. Finally, hedging reduces the probability of financial distress and 
thereby increases duration of contractual relations between shareholders. By 
fostering corporate reputation acquisition, hedging contributes directly to the 
amelioration of the moral-hazard agency problem. 
MacMinn and Han (1990) have argued that, by smoothing cash flows, 
hedging will tend to ameliorate the risk-shifting agency problem. Thus, the 
existing claimholders of the firm are motivated to include provisions in the debt 
contract limiting the opportunities to transfer wealth from the bondholders. Debt 
indentures frequently contain covenants requiring the firm to maintain certain 
types of hedging activity. Mayers and Smith (1982) analysis suggests that these 
provisions reduce the incentive of the firm’s other claimholders to accept certain 
risk-increasing negative net present value projects after the sale of the bond 
issue. Since potential wealth transfers from bondholders to the firm’s other 
claimholders are increased the larger the fixed claims in the capital structure, 
they have argued that the probability of inclusion of hedging covenants will 
increase with the firm’s debt/equity ratio. 
The nature of the firm’s investment opportunity set affects the conflict 
between the firm’s fixed and residual claimholders. Myers (1977) has shown that 
issuance of claims with higher priority than equity (senior claims) creates 
incentives for the firm’s equity holders to ‘‘underinvest’’. A profitable project 
may be rejected by management if the expected payoff is sufficient to cover the 
cost of debt only, thus leaving no residual cash flow for shareholders. Hedging 
mitigates this problem by decreasing the number of states in which the firm 
would default on bond payments. Corporate risk management represents a means 
to eliminate or alleviate conflict of interests between debt holders and 
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stockholders, and the associated welfare loss resulting from non-realised value-
increasing investments by reducing the volatility of firm value.  
Bessembinder (1991) has shown that corporate hedging reduces incentives to 
underinvest, effectively bonding the firm’s equity holders to undertake additional 
positive NPV investment. He has argued that the hedge shifts individual future 
states from default to nondefault outcomes, increasing the number of future 
states in which equity holders are the residual claimants. As a result, the 
sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment is reduced. 
Bessembinder (1991) also noted that the hedge results in equity holders receiving 
a larger proportion of the incremental benefits from new projects, which 
increases their willingness to provide funds for additional capital investment, as 
well as it increases their value due to avoided agency costs.  
Minton and Schrand (1999) have also documented that companies with 
more cash flow variation have lower levels of investment and higher costs 
associated with external capital. They conclude that cash flow volatility can 
lead companies to underinvest. Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) have 
argued that equity values reflect this potential underinvestment. Their empirical 
tests have shown that the sensitivity of an oil producer's value to changes in oil 
price uncertainty is related to proxies for the likelihood that the producer will 
encounter costly market imperfections, such as financial distress and 
underinvestment. They conclude that by reducing the expected costs from these 
market imperfections, corporate risk management can increase shareholder value. 
MacMinn (1987) has shown that an appropriately selected insurance portfolio 
will increase the safety of debt and allow stockholders to capture all the 
additional returns from further investment. The model has shown that the 
corporation has an incentive to purchase insurance because it may eliminate or 
reduce the bankruptcy and/or agency costs.  
2.3 Capital Market Imperfections and Costly External Financing 
Smith and Stulz (1985) have demonstrated how the reduction in expected 
bankruptcy cost (due to a lower probability of entering bankruptcy) can increase 
the firm’s value, ceteris paribus. In addition, the lower probability of financial 
distress can help the firm make sales or invest in future profitable projects which 
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would have otherwise been lost. Cash flow is crucial to the investment process, 
and the investment process is a key factor for a corporate value creation. Cash 
flow can often be disrupted by movements in external factors such as exchange 
rates, commodity prices and interest rates, potentially compromising a 
company’s ability to invest.  
This theory examines the role of capital market imperfections in 
determining the demand for corporate hedging. The main hypothesis is that, if 
access to external financing (debt and/or equity) is costly, firms with investment 
projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their 
funds, which could precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets. An interesting 
empirical insight based on this rationale is that firms which have substantial 
growth opportunities and face high costs when raising funds under financial 
distress will have an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the average 
firm. This rationale has been explored by numerous scholars, among others by 
Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1998), Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter, Randall and 
Lie (2002). 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) have accepted the basic paradigm of 
the financial distress model, but they rationalised the cost of bad outcomes by 
reference to Myers (1977) debt overhang argument. In their model, external 
financing is more costly than internally generated funds due to numerous capital 
market imperfections (see Myers and Majluf, 1984). These may include discrete 
transaction costs to obtain external financing, imperfect information as to the 
riskiness of the investment opportunities present in the firm, or the high cost of 
the potential future bankruptcy state. At the same time, the firm has an 
investment opportunity set which can be ordered in terms of net present value. 
The existence of the cost imperfections results in underinvestment in some states, 
where internally generated funds fall short of the amount of new investment that 
would be profitable in the absence of these capital market imperfections.  
Stated in another way, the volatility of profitability causes the firm to 
seek external financing to exploit investment opportunities when profits are low. 
The cost of such external finance is higher than the internal funds due to the 
market’s higher cost structure associated with the factors enumerated above. This 
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reduces optimal investment and the cost of volatility in such a model is the 
forgone investment in each period that the firm is forced to seek external funds. 
Recognising this outcome, the firm embarks upon volatility reducing strategies, 
which have the effect of reducing the variability of earnings. Hence, risk 
management is optimal in that it allows the firm to obtain the highest expected 
shareholder value. All else equal, the more difficulty a company has in 
obtaining outside financing, the more costly a shortfall in cash flow will be 
and the greater is the value hedging provides. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 
(1993) have supported this theory with reference to evidence offered by Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) which presented evidence that internal cash flow 
is, in fact, correlated to corporate investment.  
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) have conducted empirical tests of the 
theory that shareholders of financially constrained firms can benefit from 
corporate risk management. Their analysis of 68 oil producers for the period 
1992 to 1994 has shown that the point at which a company encounters a cash 
shortfall varies across firms according to firm-specific characteristics. For many 
firms, in particular those with stable cash flows, minimal financial obligations, and 
therefore significant financial flexibility, the expected costs of underinvestment 
and financial distress are trivial. However, firms with higher levels of financial 
leverage, and therefore decreased financial flexibility, face a greater likelihood of 
encountering the costs of market imperfections. Overall, their findings indicate 
that capital markets incorporate the anticipated costs from cash flow variability 
into stock prices. These findings also support Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Mello and Parsons (2000), who suggested that 
the benefits that shareholders realise from reducing cash flow variability by 
managing risks are associated with the likelihood that the firm will encounter 
underinvestment or bankruptcy.  
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) results complement and extend the 
findings of other corporate risk management studies. Specifically, Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (1999) and Haushalter (2000) 
show that companies that are more likely to face market imperfections manage 
risks more extensively. Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) results indicate that 
these are the types of companies that can realise the greatest benefits from 
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reducing cash flow uncertainty. Therefore, in a broad sense, observed risk 
management policies are consistent with shareholder value maximisation.  
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) conducted a research on the 372 of the 
Fortune 500 nonfinancial firms in 1990, and proven the hypothesis that hedging 
is used to reduce variability in the level of investments. They have found that 
firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter financial constraints (low 
accessibility to external financing) are more likely to use currency derivatives. 
This result is consistent with the notion that firms use derivatives to reduce the 
variation in cash flows or earnings that might otherwise preclude firms from 
investing in valuable growth opportunities. This result was confirmed by 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) as well. Their study has proven that, similar to 
Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), firms with larger R&D expenditures are 
more likely to use currency derivatives.  
A study by Gay and Nam (1998) has also provided strong support for the 
hypothesis that corporate hedging activity is carried out to minimise the 
underinvestment problem. Gay and Nam (1998) have found that firms with 
enhanced investment opportunity sets increase their use of derivatives as their 
levels of internally generated cash decline. They have shown that when internally 
generated cash flows are positively correlated with investment opportunities, 
firms use fewer derivatives. Gay and Nam (1998) results clearly support the 
shareholder value maximisation hypothesis. These results indicate that firms act 
in a manner consistent with the predictions of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
– minimising the underinvestment problem. 
Risk managers spend much of their time examining the factors that cause 
cash flows to fluctuate. This is important work, since low cash flows may throw 
budgets into disarray, distract managers from productive work, defer capital 
expenditure or delay debt repayments. By avoiding these deadweight losses, risk 
managers can rightly claim they add to shareholder value. Consistent with this 
claim that cash flow volatility is costly, Minton and Schrand (1999) have 
documented that cash flow volatility is associated both with lower investment 
and with higher costs of accessing external capital. They have shown that higher 
cash flow volatility is associated with lower average levels of investment in 
capital expenditures, R&D, and advertising. This association suggests that firms 
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do not use external capital markets to fully cover cash flow shortfalls, but rather 
permanently forgo investment. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont (1997) 
all found a negative relation between annual investment levels and liquidity, but 
could not distinguish whether firms with volatile cash flows time their 
investment decisions to match internal cash flow realisations or actually decrease 
their overall level of investment. In contrast to them, Minton and Schrand (1999) 
findings have revealed a negative relation between volatility, measured over a 
period, and the average level of investment measured over the same period, 
suggesting that firms that experience shortfalls ultimately forgo investment.  
Another perspective related to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
pertains to the Myers and Majluf (1984) ''pecking order" concept of financing. 
Hedging, by its ability to decrease the variability of cash flow, enables the firm to 
reduce the number of states of nature where it must obtain external financing 
(and thus hedging can help avoid sending a potentially negative signal to external 
investors). 
2.4  Taxes 
It is also important to note that although firms facing binding 
financial constraints can benefit from hedging, reducing firms’ dependence on 
the capital markets, does not automatically translate to an increase in 
shareholder wealth. In fact, Tufano (1998) points out that hedging can lead to 
overinvestment. If hedging enables managers to take on projects without 
facing scrutiny from the capital markets, it can enable managers to finance 
projects that benefit managers but reduce shareholders’ wealth. So although 
firms facing financial constraints hedge more extensively, this relation does 
not imply that hedging increases shareholder value.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that the structure of the tax code can make it 
beneficial for the firms to take positions in futures, forward, or option markets. If 
a firm's effective tax function is linear (the firm faces a constant effective 
marginal tax rate), the firm's expected tax liability is unaffected by the volatility 
of taxable income. But if effective marginal corporate tax rates are an increasing 
function of the corporation’s pre-tax value, or stated differently, if a firm faces a 
convex tax function, then the after-tax value of the firm is a concave function of 
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its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, then 
the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the firm is 
increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the 
effective long run average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in 
reported earnings will enhance shareholder value. More convex the effective tax 
schedule is, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) have argued that the logic of this thesis is straight-forward - 
convexity implies that a more volatile earnings stream leads to higher expected 
taxes than a less volatile earnings stream. Convexity in the tax function is quite 
plausible for some firms, particularly those who face a significant probability of 
negative earnings and are unable to carry forward 100 per cent of their taxes 
losses to subsequent periods. 
Statutory progressivity causes the tax schedule to be convex. In addition 
to statutory progressivity, tax preference items (for example, tax loss carry 
forwards, foreign tax credits, and investment tax credits) also make the effective 
tax schedule convex (Zimmerman, 1988). Tax preference items, which are 
subtracted from pre-tax income, indirectly create convexity in the tax liability 
(concavity in a firm value), because the present value of unused preference items 
decreases as they are carried forward to future periods. Reducing variance 
through hedging increases the expected value of tax benefits because the 
probability of using preference items increases with the level of a firm’s taxable 
income. The tax code generally specifies that if the firm’s pretax income falls 
below some level, the value of tax preference items is reduced by either the loss 
of the tax shield or postponement of its use (Gurel and Pyle, 1984). Hence, 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) have concluded that the tax benefit is greater 
if the firm has more tax preference items. 
Graham and Smith (1996) have used simulation methods in their work 
to investigate convexity induced by tax-code provisions. Authors have explored 
how uncertainty about future taxable income interacts with major provisions 
of the tax code, including statutory progressivity, tax-loss carry-backs and carry-
forwards, investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. From 
their analysis of more than 80,000 COMPUSTAT firm-year observations, 
they found that in approximately 50 per cent of the cases, corporations face 
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convex effective tax functions and thus have tax-based incentives to hedge. 
In approximately 25 per cent of the cases, firms face linear tax functions. 
The remaining firms face concave effective tax functions (which provide a 
tax-based disincentive to hedge). Among analysed firms facing convex tax 
functions, roughly one-quarter of the firms have potential tax savings from 
hedging that appear material - in extreme cases exceeding 40 per cent of the 
expected tax liability. For the remaining firms, the tax savings are fairly 
small - average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of 
taxable income are about 5.4 per cent of expected tax liabilities base. 
Applied simulation methods also allowed Graham and Smith (1996) to 
decompose the basic structure of the tax code to examine the incremental 
impact of statutory progressivity, net operating loss, carry-backs and carry-
forwards, investment tax credits, the alternative minimum tax, and 
uncertainty in taxable income. They found that much of the convexity is 
induced by the asymmetric treatment of profits and losses in the tax code. 
Carry-back and carry-forward provisions effectively allow firms to smooth 
their losses, thereby reducing tax-function curvature at its most convex 
points and making the function convex over a broader range of taxable 
income. In contrast, the alternative minimum tax and investment tax credits 
have only a modest effect on the convexity of the tax function. 
Mayers and Smith (1982) have proven that firms with more convex tax 
schedules (e.g., due to large tax loss carry-forwards or very low net income) are 
more likely to engage in hedging activities. The evidence in Mian’s study (1996) is 
mixed with respect to the hypothesis that hedging decisions are motivated by tax 
saving strategies. Consistent with the tax hypotheses, Mian has found incidence 
of foreign tax credit (as a proxy for tax shield) to be generally associated with a 
higher likelihood of hedging. Inconsistent with the tax hypothesis, there is no 
robust relation between hedging and incidence of progressivity in tax schedule, 
and between hedging and incidence of tax loss carry forwards.  
It could be argued that, when judging the importance of the magnitude of 
the potential tax benefits, for firms with convex effective tax functions, the tax 
savings of hedging are not mutually exclusive from the hedging benefits of 
controlling underinvestment problems, increased debt capacity, or reduced agency 
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cost of various classes of the firm's claimholders. The total benefit of hedging is 
the combination of these motives. Therefore, with the appropriate choice of 
hedging instruments, a firm can simultaneously manage the impact on its value, 
reported income, and taxable income.  
3. Managerial Utility Maximisation Hypothesis 
Shareholders hire managers because they have specialised knowledge and skills 
that increase the value of the firm. Managers cannot use their expertise unless 
they have some discretion in the choice of their actions. Yet, it should be 
emphasised that, unless faced with proper incentives, managers will not 
maximise shareholder wealth. Firm managers have limited ability to diversify 
their own personal wealth position, associated with stock holdings and their 
career earnings from their own employment position. Therefore, managers prefer 
stability to volatility because, other things being equal, such stability improves 
their own wealth, at little or no expense to other stakeholders (see Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980)). To avoid this problem, managerial 
compensation contract must be designed in a way that, when managers increase 
the value of the firm, they also increase their own expected utility. 
This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984). This argument can be 
traced back to the literature on the theory of agency. Ross (1973) has argued that 
an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, called 
an agent, acts as representative for the other, called a principal, in a particular 
domain of decision problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) 
have discussed the conflict of interest between the owners and the managers of a 
corporation. They have assumed that the contracting parties form rational 
expectations and seek to maximise their individual expected utilities within the 
effective constraints implied by their contracts. Thus, conflicts of interests arise 
among the contracting parties whenever discretionary behaviour is authorised. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that incentives exist to write contracts 
which maximise the current market value of the firm. Conflicts of interest 
between the owners and the managers can provide a basis for the corporate 
demand for hedging.  
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Amihud and Lev (1981) have argued that two versions of motive for 
corporate risk reduction exist. In the first one, managers seek to reduce the 
probability of bankruptcy in order to enhance their job security and preserve their 
investment in firm-specific human capital. For example, the manager’s working 
life is limited while the corporate form gives the firm an indefinite life. This 
difference in time horizons produces an incentive conflict. The second version of 
the agency motive for corporate risk reduction maintains that if risk-averse 
managers are compensated on the basis of their firm's earnings, they prefer a 
stable earnings stream. The manager’s claim on the firm has a life which is 
related to the life of his job. If his compensation package includes a bonus based 
on reported earnings, postponing selected expenditures until after retirement can 
increase his expected compensation. In this context, Holmstrom (1979) has 
discussed that managers may take a variety of risk reducing actions at the 
expense of shareholders.  
Manager’s behaviour is predictable and will be anticipated by the owners 
of the corporation, therefore his overall compensation is going to be adjusted to 
reflect manager’s anticipated actions. Because the adjustment will include 
anticipated avoidable costs, managers have incentives to make believable 
promises not to engage in these activities by allowing monitoring and offering to 
bond their actions (Mayers and Smith, 1982). In both versions, the agency 
problem arises because managers care about total risk (systematic risk as well as 
business risk). Shareholders, however, care only about the systematic component 
of total risk, since they can diversify their portfolios to compensate for business 
risk.  
Fatemi and Luft (2002) have argued that, under such conditions, the 
managerial risk aversion hypothesis predicts that the managers will engage in full 
cover hedging. That is, they will attempt to eliminate deviations below, as well as 
those above the mean of the probability distribution of the firm’s net cash flows. 
This pattern of risk management may be further strengthened by managerial 
compensation schemes that encourage the achievements of static performance 
targets. Therefore, the managerial risk aversion hypothesis assumes that risk 
management strategies are implemented, principally, to enhance the position of 
the firm’s management. This brings into focus the agency costs arising from the 
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conflicts between management and shareholders. In analysing this problem, it 
should be emphasised that full cover hedging eliminates desirable (upper tail) 
outcomes as well as all the undesirable (lower tail) outcomes. As such, full cover 
hedging does not enhance the firm’s or shareholder value. The benefits derived 
from it accrue only to the management. In its extreme form, Fatemi and Luft 
(2002) have emphasised that the full cover hedging can be used to protect the 
management at the expense of shareholder.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) have claimed that managers’ compensation 
plans can influence their hedging choices. Specifically, the incorporation of 
option-like provisions in managers’ compensation increases the incentives for 
managers to take risks. The expected utility of managerial wealth has a shape of 
a convex function of the firm’s expected profits when managers own unexercised 
options. Therefore, they have concluded that the more option-like features there 
are in the compensation plans, the managers will hedge less. In this case, 
managers can choose to increase the risk of the firm in order to increase the 
value of their options. For instance, bonus plans that make a payment to 
managers only if accounting earnings exceed some target number will induce 
managers to hedge less since this payment is a convex function of accounting 
earnings. Results of some empirical studies have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g. 
see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. However, it will generally not 
be efficient to eliminate all incentives to hedge. While presenting shareholder 
maximisation hypothesis in previous sections of our thesis, it has been shown 
that hedging is value increasing strategy. Moreover, a compensation plan that 
eliminates all hedging incentives would be costly to negotiate and implement. 
Smith and Stulz’s prediction is confirmed by Tufano (1996) who 
examined commodity hedging activities in the gold mining industry on the 
sample of the 48 North American gold mines. He has found that firms’ use of 
commodity derivatives is negatively related to the number of options their 
managers and directors hold, and positively related to the value of their stock 
holdings. This evidence is consistent with theories of managerial risk aversion, 
but such use of derivatives may not add to the value of a firm. One must be 
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careful not to over-interpret the results of a single-industry study of a few dozen 
observations per year. With this in mind, Tufano (1996) study has suggested that 
risk management practices in the gold mining industry appear to be associated 
with both firm and managerial characteristics, although theories of managerial 
risk aversion seem more informative than those of shareholder value 
maximisation.  
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric 
information, is put forward by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1992), who focus on managers’ reputations. They have argued that 
managers may prefer to engage in risk management so as to better communicate 
their skills to the labour market. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1992) have argued that younger executives are more willing to 
embrace new concepts like risk management, than are their older colleagues. 
Managerial tenure might play a similar role, because it is possible that short-
tenure financial managers would have less developed reputations than longer-
tenure managers. Therefore, they would have an incentive to signal their quality 
through hedging. To the extent these assumptions are correct, firms with younger 
managers, and those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job would be 
more willing to manage risk.  
Contrary to Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) predictions regarding the 
managers tenure, May (1995) has argued that managers years with the firm 
should be negatively related to the firm risk characteristics, therefore creating a 
greater incentive to hedge. This is because managerial skills become more firm-
specific as time spent with the firm increases. May (1995) has assumed that, if 
diversification reduces human capital risk, firms whose managers have more 
years vested are more likely to pursue hedging strategies.  
Tufano (1996) has tested these assumptions and found that there is no 
meaningful relationship between CEO and CFO age and the extent of risk 
management activity, except a negative relationship between CFO age and risk 
management. The lack of association between age and risk management might 
be the result of age acting as a factor that influences both risk aversion and 
predilection to use sophisticated financial instruments. However, tenure’s 
association with risk management is stronger. Tufano (1996) has proven that 
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firms whose CFOs have fewer years in their current job are more likely to 
engage in greater risk management activities, confirming the hypothesis that 
newer executives are more willing to engage in risk management activities than 
are their counterparts with long-tenures. Thus, the results can be seen as 
consistent with Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) theory. However, their model 
would seem to apply to CEOs as well as CFOs – the finding that tenure of the 
CEO is not related to the level of risk management is a warning not to over-
interpret these results. However, Tufano’s (1996) finding supports the general 
contention that managerial motives may be relevant in creating corporate risk 
management policy. On the other hand, the result could also reflect that firms 
wishing to do financial risk management, tend to hire new financial managers 
who are skilled with the appropriate tools and techniques. 
4. Conclusion 
For a long time it was believed that corporate risk management is irrelevant to the 
value of the firm and the arguments in favour of the irrelevance were based on the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). It has been only two 
decades that both scholars and practitioners have realised that managing 
corporate risk lies in the heart of a competitive corporate strategy. As an 
explanation for this clash between theory and practice, imperfections in the capital 
market are used to argue for the relevance of corporate risk management function. 
Based on seminal work by Mayers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate 
demand for insurance, researchers such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), 
and Shapiro and Titman (1998) have examined why large, diversified firms 
actively engage in hedging activities. These authors argued that the earlier 
theories are applicable to individuals and small, closely held firms but could not 
be used as a solid theoretical rationale for hedging by large corporations. The 
authors demonstrated several theories of hedging which overcome the 
irrelevancy arguments of modern portfolio and corporate finance theory. Most of 
these theories rely on the introduction of some frictions into the M&M model, 
and argue that market imperfections enable firms to add value through hedges 
that can not be exactly duplicated by individual investors.  
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The survey of literature presented in this paper has revealed that there are 
two chief classes of rationales for corporate decision to hedge - maximisation of 
shareholder value or maximisation of managers’ private utility. Positive theories 
of risk management, as a lever for shareholder value creation, argue that firm 
value is a concave objective function because of capital market imperfections. 
The first theory suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can 
decrease costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 
1985; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998). In the MM world, 
financial distress is assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the probability of 
financial distress does not affect firm value. If financial distress is costly, firms 
have incentives to reduce its probability, and hedging is one method by which a 
firm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing the variance of a firm’s 
cash flows or accounting profits, hedging decreases the probability, and thus the 
expected costs, of financial distress.  
The second hedging rationale suggests that, by reducing the volatility of 
cash flows, firms can decrease agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to Dobson and Soenen (1993) hedging reduces uncertainty by 
smoothing the cash flow stream thereby lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since 
the agency cost is borne by management, assuming informational asymmetry 
between management and bondholders, hedging will increase the value of the 
firm. Therefore, management will rationally choose to hedge. Additionally, 
given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing through exchange 
risk hedging will tend to reduce the risk-shifting as well as the underinvestment 
problems (see Jensen and Smith, 1985). Results of MacMinn (1987), MacMinn 
and Han (1990), Bessembinder (1991), Minton and Schrand (1999) and 
Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) supports this hedging rationale.  
Another theory that focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise 
shareholder value argue that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can 
decrease expected taxes. This rationale is put forward by Smith and Stulz (1985) 
who have argued that, if hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, 
then the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the 
firm is increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing 
the effective long run average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in 
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reported earnings will enhance shareholder value. More convex the effective tax 
schedule is, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. This rationale has been 
supported by Zimmerman (1988), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996) and Graham and Smith (1996).  
In addition, reducing cash flow volatility can improve the probability of 
having sufficient internal funds for planned investments eliminating the need 
either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external 
funding. An interesting empirical insight based on this rationale is that firms 
which have substantial growth opportunities and face high costs when raising 
funds under financial distress, will have an incentive to hedge more of their 
exposure than the average firm. This rationale has been explored by numerous 
scholars, among others by Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990), 
Shapiro and Titman (1998), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam 
(1998), Graham and Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand (1999), Haushalter 
(2000), Mello and Parsons (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, 
Randall and Lie (2002). 
Other line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders value 
maximisation hypothesis refers to the managerial utility maximisation 
hypothesis. It argues that firm managers have limited ability to diversify their 
own personal wealth position, associated with stock holdings and the 
capitalisation of their career earnings associated with their own employment 
position. Therefore, they will have an incentive to hedge their own wealth on the 
expense of the shareholders. Usually that kind of hedging is not conducted to 
improve value of company’s stockholders but to improve managers own wealth. 
To avoid this problem, managerial compensation contract must be designed so 
that when managers increase the value of the firm, they also increase their 
expected utility. This can usually be obtained by adding option-like provisions to 
managerial contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has 
been further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). Results of some empirical 
studies have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g. see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 
1998), while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter 
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(2000) have not found evidence that corporate hedging is affected by managerial 
shareholdings. 
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric 
information, has been presented by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who have focused on managers’ reputations. In 
both of these models, it is argued that managers may prefer to engage in risk 
management activities in order to better communicate their skills to the labour 
market. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have 
argued that younger executives and those with shorter tenures have less 
developed reputations than older as well as longer-tenure managers. Therefore, 
they are more willing to embrace new concepts like risk management with the 
intention to signal their management quality. Tufano (1996) has tested these 
assumptions and found that there is no meaningful relationship between CEO 
and CFO age and the extent of risk management activity. However, he has 
proven that firms whose CFOs have fewer years in their current job are more 
likely to engage in greater risk management activities, confirming the hypothesis 
that newer executives are more willing to engage in risk management activities 
than are their counterparts with long-tenures. Thus, the results can be seen as 
consistent with Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) and DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1992) theory. 
Overall, the results of the literature review presented in this paper suggest 
that the use of derivatives and risk management practices are broadly consistent 
with the predictions of the theoretical literature, which is based upon value-
maximising behaviour. By hedging financial risks such as currency, interest rate 
and commodity risk, firms can decrease cash flow volatility, which leads to a 
lower variance of the firm’s value. This means that not only the firm value 
moves less, but that the probability of occurring low values is smaller than 
without hedging. The analysis has shown that, if hedging decisions are capable 
of increasing firm values, they can do so for reasons such as the following: they 
reduce the probability or costs of financial distress, they reduce taxes or 
transactions costs, they reduce the costs associated with information 
“asymmetries” by signalling management's view of the company's prospects to 
investors, or they reduce “agency” problems (conflicts of interest among 
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management, shareholders, and creditors), including distortions of management's 
incentives to undertake all value-adding investments. 
However, it needs to be emphasised that, in spite of the extensive body of 
literature on corporate risk management and the efforts that have been devoted in 
developing rationales for hedging, there is not yet a single accepted framework 
which can be used to guide empirical hedging strategies. There is no consensus 
as to what hedging rationale is the most important in explaining risk management 
as a corporate policy. The total benefit of hedging is the combination of these 
motives - e.g. the benefit of increased debt capacity is not mutually exclusive 
from the hedging benefits of controlling underinvestment problems, tax savings, in-
creased debt capacity, or reduced agency cost of various classes of the firm's 
claimholders. It can be concluded that, if the costs of using corporate risk 
management instruments, e.g. financial derivatives that include employee 
salaries, computers, training as well as transaction costs and the costs of the 
internal control systems, are less than the benefits provided via the avenues 
mentioned in this paper, or any other benefit perceived by the market, then risk 
management is a shareholder-value enhancing activity.   
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